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For more than a century, the United States Supreme Court has
read the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment1 as a
limitation on the jurisdiction of state courts.2 The minimum contacts
doctrine, inaugurated by the Court in 1945,3 remains the dominant
doctrinal element of jurisdictional due process. Under the current
formulation of the minimum contacts doctrine,4 a state court
generally may exercise jurisdiction over a citizen of some other state
Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia. The author would like to
thank Lea Brilmayer, Walter Hellerstein, Alan Watson, Michael Wells, and the
participants in a faculty seminar at the University of Georgia for their comments
on an earlier draft.
1. "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. It was in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), that the Court first declared that
the clause limits state court jurisdiction.
3. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4. Justice Brennan's opinion in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985),
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or nation in a civil action only if the defendant purposefully5 has
established the right sort of relationship with the forum state.6 If the
extension of judicial power passes this threshold minimum contacts
test, then there is a strong presumption in favor of its
constitutionality, and the defendant can establish a violation of
jurisdictional due pr 6 cess only by making a compelling showing that
requiring the defendant to litigate in the forum imposes an unfair
burden on the defendant.7
Critics of the minimum contacts doctrine, preferring less stringent
constitutional limits on state court jurisdiction,8 argue that the way is
open for reform because the Court itself has failed to articulate any
cogent theoretical justification for the proposition that purposeful
contacts of the right sort should be a sine qua non for the extension of
state judicial power against a noncitizen. 9 A formidable theoretical
defense of the minimum contacts doctrine can be constructed,
however, from ideas published roughly during the past decade and a
includes the Court's most elaborate modern articulation of the elements of the
doctrine.
5. See infra notes 49-70 and accompanying text (discussing purposeful availment
requirement).
6. See infra notes 40-48 and accompanying text (discussing specific jurisdiction and
general jurisdiction).
7. See infra text accompanying note 60 (discussing test established in Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)).
8. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Interstate Venue, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 711 (1979)
(proposing that the restrictive features of minimum contacts doctrine should be
discarded in favor of regime in which state court is permitted to exercise
jurisdiction if state is appropriate forum according to criteria employed in typical
venue provisions); Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal
Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 1112, 1137 (1981)
(suggesting that the "only concern of principled due process jurisdictional
analysis should be the avoidance of inconvenience to the defendant" and not
presence or absence of minimum contacts between defendant and forum state);
Louise Weinberg, The Helicopter Case and the Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction, 58
S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 928 (1985) (arguing that the excessive solicitude for interests
of defendant embodied in minimum contacts doctrine should be abandoned in
favor of approach that balances convenience interests of all of the parties);
Russell J. Weintraub, Due Process Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction of
State Courts: Time for Change, 63 OR. L. REv. 485 (1984) (proposing that the
requirement of nexus between forum state and defendant should be rejected in
favor of multi-factored inquiry that focuses on fairness to defendant under all the
circumstances); Arthur T. von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General
Theories Compared and Evaluated, 63 B.U. L. REv. 279,320 (1983) (observing that
under the minimum contacts doctrine the Court has failed to "explore and
develop the principle of relative litigational ability").
9. See, e.g., Stewart Jay, "Minimum Contacts" as Unified Theory of Personal
Jurisdiction.. A Reappraisal, 59 N.C. L. REV. 429, 475 (1981) (stating "the
[minimum contacts] theory . . . lacks any kind of sustaining foundation.");
Weinberg, supra note 8, at 919 (observing that the minimum contacts doctrine
amounts to rules without reasons).
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half by Professor Lea BrilmayerO and a few other jurisdictional
10. Profesor Brilmayer first articulated the basic elements of her theory in Lea
Brilmayer, How Contacts Count Due Process Limitations on State Court
Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. CT. REv. 77 [hereinafter Brilmayer, How Contacts Count].
In subsequent publications, writing sometimes with student co-authors, she has
fleshed out many of the details. LEA BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM ch. 1 (1986) [hereinafter
BRILMAYER, AN INTRoDUCTIoN]; Lea Brilmayer, Consen Contract and
Territory, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1989); Lea Brilmayer, Credit Due Judgments and
Credit Due Laws: The Respective Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit
in the Interstate Context, 70 IOWA L. REv. 95 (1984); Lea Brilmayer et al., A
General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721 (1988); Lea Brilmayer,
Jurisdictional Due Process and Political Theory, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 293 (1987)
[hereinafter Brilmayer, Jurisdictional Due Process]; Lea Brilmayer & Kathleen
Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive Legal Relations: Corporations,
Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1986); Lea Brilmayer, Related
Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV., 1444 (1988) [hereinafter
Brilmayer, Related Contacts]; Lea Brilmayer, Shaping and Sharing in
Democratic Theory: Towards a Political Philosophy of Interstate Equality. 15
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 389 (1987) [hereinafter Brilmayer, Shaping and Sharing]; Lea
Brilmayer & Ronald D. Lee, State Sovereignty and the Two Faces of Federalism:
A Comparative Study of Federal Jurisdiction and the Conflict of Laws. 60 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 833 (1985).
At about the same time that she began writing about jurisdictional due
process, Professor Brilmayer also began writing about conflict of laws. Lea
Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV.
392 (1980); Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Federalism, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 949; Lea
Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate Problems: As Between State and
Federal Law, 79 MCH. L. REv. 1315 (1981). And her interest in conflicts doctrine
has continued. Lea Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House
Without Foundations, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 459 (1985); Lea Brilmayer, Methods and
Objectives in the Conflict of Laws: A Challenge, 35 MERCER L. REv. 555 (1984);
Lea Brilmayer, The Other State's Interests, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 233 (1991).
Recently, she offered a normative theory of conflict of laws that draws heavily on
her account of jurisdictional due process. Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and
Choice Of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277 (1989) [hereinafter Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness,
and Choice of Law].
In some of her most interesting writing, Professor Brilmayer has deployed the
principles of political legitimacy that animate her account of jurisdictional due
process to shed light in other areas, including the so-called Carolene Products
approach to constitutional adjudication, Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and
the Fate of the "Inside-Outsider", 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (1986), and the debate
between liberal legal theorists and communitarians, Lea Brilmayer, Liberalism,
Community, and State Borders, 41 DuKE L.J. 1 (1991).
Finally, Professor Brilmayer's interest in the implications of state borders has
led naturally to an interest in the implications of international borders. LEA
BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL ACTS (1989); Lea Brilmayer, The
Extraterritorial Application of American Law: A Methodological and
Constitutional Appraisal, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 11-38;
Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100
YALE L.J. 2277 (1991); Lea Brilmayer, International Remedies, 14 YALE J. INT'L
L. 579 (1989); Lea Brilmayer, The Odd Advantage of Reliable Enemies, 32 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 331 (1991); Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A
Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 177 (1991).
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scholars." This defense might be termed the legitimacy theory of
state court jurisdiction. The theory asserts that the major elements of
the minimum contacts doctrine protect defendants who are citizens of
other states or nations against politically illegitimate exercises of state
judicial power.' 2 According to the theory, the problem of state court
authority over these noncitizens is an instance of the more general
problem in political philosophy of the legitimacy of any government's
extension of official coercion.' 3 A summons issued by a state court to
a noncitizen is an order14 from a government that is not the
noncitizen's government, backed generally by a threat to extend
official coercion to seize and sell the reachable assets of the
noncitizen.15 When a state court orders a citizen to appear and defend
a lawsuit, the defendant ordinarily does not question the political
legitimacy of the summons because the summons is an order issued by
the defendant's own government.' 6 Conversely, when a government
11. Two scholars who recently have offered accounts of jurisdictional due process
similar to Professor Brilmayer's are Margaret Stewart and Roger Trangsrud.
Margaret G. Stewart, A New Litany of Personal Jurisdiction, 60 U. CoLO. L. REv.
5 (1989); Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal
Jurisdiction, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 849, 871-72 (1989).
Two scholars who are critics of the minimum contacts doctrine nevertheless
share with Professors Brilmayer, Stewart, and Trangsrud the conviction that the
problem of state court jurisdiction is a problem of political legitimacy. Allan R.
Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal
Jurisdiction, 65 TEx. L. REV. 689 (1987); Arthur M. Weisburd, Territorial
Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 377, 380 (1985).
12. Brilmayer et al., supra note 10, at 726 (arguing that political legitimacy is always
an issue when court asserts adjudicatory jurisdiction); Stein, supra note 11, at 761
(asserting that theories of state court jurisdiction define when and how state may
command obedience from individual); Stewart, supra note 11, at 19 (stating that
an assertion of judicial authority against political outsider is illegitimate unless
outsider has consented); Trangsrud, supra note 11, at 884-85 (arguing that the
touchstone of jurisdiction should be consent of litigants or some other
legitimating political principle); Weisburd, supra note 11, at 378 (stating that "the
controversy over standards of personal jurisdiction... is a dispute about how to
determine when particular state government may demand obedience from a
particular person.").
13. E.g., Brilmayer, Jurisdictional Due Process, supra note 10, at 294-95 (noting that
chief concern of political theory has been to analyze problem of legitimacy of
official coercion and that jurisdictional due process presents this problem in
interstate context).
14. Weisburd, supra note 11, at 402 ("The state does not simply invite defendants to
participate in a civil suit; it orders them to do so.").
15. Brilmayer et al., supra note 10, at 726 ("Adjudicative jurisdiction is one way in
which the state asserts coercive power over individuals."); Weisburd, supra note
11, at 385 ("Every time a summons issues, the state is ordering defendant to come
to court and warning [defendant] that if he disobeys, he will suffer judgment.").
16. Professor Brilmayer characterizes as "a first principle," Brilmayer, How Contacts
Count, supra note 10, at 85, the proposition that "there can be no sovereignty
objections to a State requiring its own citizens to appear and defend a suit
brought in its courts." Id. (footnote omitted). She also notes that "[t]he proper
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demands obedience from an outsider, the political legitimacy of the
demand is not self-evident and must rest on reasons other than the
reasons that justify a government's orders to its own citizen.17 The
minimum contacts doctrine, or so the argument goes, protects
noncitizens against state court authority that is not backed by such
reasons.
The legitimacy theory offers itself as a constructive account1 8 of
the Court's jurisdictional due process precedents. That is to say, the
theory claims to fit the Court's precedents well enough to count as an
interpretation and not an invention, and it claims to justify what the
Court has been doing.19 As a descriptive matter, the theory is
especially impressive. While the Court itself never has defended all of
the major elements of the minimum contacts doctrine explicitly as
flowing from any overall theory of political legitimacy,20  a
constructive account can be successful even if it has not been
articulated in so many words in judicial opinions, so long as it fits what
a court actually does.21 As Part I of this Article makes clear, the
response of a citizen or resident who objects is to invoke the State's political
processes, the classic remedy where the State imposes burdens on its own
members." Id See also Stein, supra note 11, at 756-57 ("The very notion of
citizenship connotes a universal allegiance to the authority of the state.");
Weisburd, supra note 11, at 378 (noting that when the Court strikes down
exercise of jurisdiction by state court as inconsistent with Due Process Clause,
Court is saying in effect that state is not entitled to demand from particular
defendant the deference that governments may expect from own citizens).
17. Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 10, at 85-86.
18. The notion of a constructive account is taken from RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE ch. 2 (1986). See generally Robert D. Brussack, The Second Labor of
Hercules: A Review of Ronald Dworkin's Law's Empire, 23 GA. L. REv. 1129
(1989)(book review).
19. See Brussack, supra note 18, at 1133-34 (describing the elements of fit and value
in Dworkin's notion of constructive interpretation).
20. Wendy C. Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal
Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REv. 479, 518 (1987);
Redish, supra note 8, at 1125. The account, however, has penetrated the pages of
the Federal Reporter. Judge Frank Easterbrook, writing for a Seventh Circuit
panel in Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1987), described
the minimum contacts doctrine in paradigmatically Brilmayerian terms:
The "minimum contacts" cases . .. require only sufficient contacts
between the defendant (or the defendant's transactions) and the forum.
The question is whether the polity, whose power the court wields,
possesses a legitimate claim to exercise force over the defendant. A state
court may lack such an entitlement to coerce, when the defendant has
transacted no business within the state and has not otherwise taken
advantage of that sovereign's protection.
Id. at 671 (citations omitted). Recently, Judge Easterbrook reiterated the point.
United Rope Distributors, Inc. v. Seatriumph Marine Corp., 930 F.2d 532, 534 (7th
Cir. 1991) (quoting Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir.
1987)).
21. DWORKIN, supra note 18, at 247-48.
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legitimacy theory nicely fits the elements of the minimum contacts
doctrine.
First, the theory elegantly explains why the minimum contacts
doctrine applies only when the defendant is a citizen of some other
state or nation, and not when the defendant is an absent citizen of the
forum polity.22 If the defendant is a member of the political
community of the forum state, then the political legitimacy of the
summons is self-evident, even if the defendant happens to be located
far from the forum when the lawsuit is brought. There is no reason,
therefore, for any further inquiry under the minimum contacts
doctrine. Second, the theory explains the distinction, familiar to
students of minimum contacts jurisprudence, between specific
jurisdiction and general jurisdiction.23 A state court may exercise
specific jurisdiction, according to the theory, because a state is entitled
to summon a noncitizen to answer for conduct that implicates a state
regulatory interest. A state court may exercise general jurisdiction
because the noncitizen's continuous and systematic contacts with the
state entitle the state to treat the noncitizen as a de facto citizen.
Third, the theory supplies a reason for the so-called purposeful
availment requirement that became a gloss on the minimum contacts
doctrine in 1958.24 The purposeful availment requirement can be seen
as adding a contractarian element to the doctrine's formula for
political legitimacy. A state is entitled to summon a noncitizen only if
the noncitizen first has made a choice to establish an affiliation with
the state. Finally, the theory fits the Court's insistence that the
minimum contacts doctrine must be extended as a threshold test. If
principles of political legitimacy animate the doctrine, and if the
doctrine flows from the most attractive conception of political
legitimacy, then a summons issued in violation of the doctrine is
nothing more than a naked threat of violence that the defendant has
no moral obligation to obey, no matter how eager the forum state
might be to serve as the forum for resolution of the dispute and no
matter how much more convenient or efficient it would be overall to
allow the forum to serve as the place of trial.
Because the legitimacy theory succeeds so well as a descriptive
matter, its normative claim deserves serious consideration. The
normative claim is that the imperative of political legitimacy justifies
the elements of the minimum contacts doctrine. Part II of this Article
examines and rejects the theory's normative claim. The legitimacy
theory operates within what might be called the reigning public law
paradigm of state court jurisdiction, which is based on the premise
that the antagonists in a jurisdictional dispute are the forum state and
22. See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 49-70 and accompanying text.
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the noncitizen defendant. The summons issued by the forum state is a
projection of government power against a person. Jurisdictional due
process, like other individual rights guarantees, protects persons
against abuses of government power. A summons that violates the
imperative of political legitimacy is an abuse of government power.
This Article presents a competing paradigm: In ordinary private
litigation, the jurisdictional antagonists are not really the forum state
and the noncitizen defendant, but the plaintiff and the noncitizen
defendant. It is the plaintiff and not the forum state that decides to
file a complaint against the defendant and to file it in one of the courts
of a particular state. The summons issued by the forum state
represents not the state's separate insistence on providing a forum for
resolving the parties' dispute, but only its willingness to provide a
forum at the instance of the plaintiff. The problem of state court
jurisdiction, viewed from within this private law paradigm, is not so
much a vertical problem of justifying a government's order to a person
as it is a horizontal problem of doing place-of-trial justice between the
parties.
In other words, the problem of state court jurisdiction in ordinary
private litigation is more akin to the problem of working out the
details of an arbitration than it is like the problem of justifying a
government's extension of its criminal law or its taxing power.25 Any
ordinary private dispute must be resolved according to some set of
substantive rules and procedures. Moreover, an interpreter of these
rules and procedures will be required, and someone will need to
decide the facts. The jurisdictional problem arises because the parties
themselves failed to agree in advance, and cannot agree now, on these
matters. The plaintiff, by filing a complaint in the courts of a
particular state, seeks to impose on the defendant a favorable
package26 of rules,27 procedures, and decision makers28 for the
25. See infra note 74.
26. See, e.g. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984) (noting
litigation strategy of countless plaintiffs who seek forum with favorable
substantive or procedural rules or sympathetic local populations).
27. For example, in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984), a libel
plaintiff from New York chose a New Hampshire forum for her action against a
nationally distributed magazine because New Hampshire's rules governing choice
of law dictated the application of the state's own statute of limitations for libel,
and New Hampshire's unusually long six-year limitations period for the tort was
the only one in the country that had not expired when the plaintiff filed her
action. Id. at 773.
28. The plaintiffs in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980),
apparently joined the New York retailer and distributor of their automobile as
defendants in the products liability action solely to prevent removal of the case
from their chosen forum, an Oklahoma state court, to a federal court, because the
state court was famous for being pro-plaintiff. Allen R. Kamp, Beyond Minimum
Contacts: The Supreme Court's New Jurisdictional Theory, 15 GA. L. REv. 19, 22
1088 [Vol. 72:1082
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resolution of their dispute. Nothing about the character of plaintiffs
or defendants as a class suggests that either side ought to have
unfettered discretion to dictate these matters to the other. The
package of rules, procedures, and decision makers for resolving a
dispute ought to be determined according to neutral principles. Just
as the primary objective of substantive private law should be to do
justice between the parties, so too the primary objective of
jurisdictional rules for ordinary private litigation ought to be to do
place-of-trial justice between the parties.
In doing place-of-trial justice, state lines matter to the plaintiff as
well as the defendant. Each side would prefer to have the dispute
resolved within a favorable litigation setting. This often means a court
close to home governed by familiar laws and procedures applied by
neighbors rather than strangers. The vocabulary of political
legitimacy, with its narrow concern for what states can do to persons,
is simply not rich enough to yield principles of place-of-trial justice
between the parties in ordinary private litigation. This Article,
therefore, proposes an alternative to the legitimacy theory and its
minimum contacts doctrine. The doctrinal centerpiece of the
alternative is a significant relationship test for place-of-trial justice,
developed in detail in Part II. The pivotal feature of the test is that it
focuses symmetrically on the extent to which the parties to a lawsuit
share a relationship with the forum state and with plausible
alternative forums for the litigation.
The significant relationship test should be attractive to some of the
critics of the minimum contacts doctrine. Overall, deployment of the
test would broaden the scope of state court jurisdiction.29 Moreover,
the test accommodates the idea that the extent of the parties'
connections with plausible forums should be weighed along with other
factors, including the relative litigational ability of the parties 3O and
the desirability of a single forum for resolving multiparty, multistate
disputes,3 ' in an overall assessment of place-of-trial justice.32 On the
n.20 (1980); Weintraub, supra note 8, at 500 n.98 (1984) (characterizing Creek
County, Oklahoma, where lawsuit was brought, as "plaintiffs' paradise").
29. See infra, e.g., notes 78-92 and accompanying text (noting that the employment of
the significant relationship test might have reversed results and permitted
jurisdiction in the Shaffer and Helicopteros cases).
30. See intfra notes 104-108 and accompanying text. The relative litigational ability of
the parties is emphasized by Professors von Mehren and Weinberg, among others.
See generally von Mehren, supra note 8 (observing that under the minimum
contacts doctrine, the Court has failed to "explore and develop the principal of
relative litigational ability"); Weinberg, supra note 8 (arguing that the excessive
solicitude for interests of the defendant embodied in minimum contacts doctrine
should be abandoned in favor of an approach that balances convenience interests
of all the parties).
31. See infra note 109 and accompanying text. This factor is emphasized by Professor
Hazard. See generally Hazard, supra note 8 (proposing that the restrictive
1993] 1089
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other hand, the test, like the minimum contacts doctrine, flows from
the premise that state lines matter centrally in doing place-of-trial
justice, and not just because litigation in one state rather than another
can determine the substantive law that will apply.3 3 The test,
therefore, is unlikely to satisfy those critics of the minimum contacts
doctrine who claim or imply that the principal fulcrum on which
jurisdictional rules should turn is convenience or efficiency.34
Part III of the Article discusses alternatives for implementing the
significant relationship test and other features of a private law regime
for doing place-of-trial justice in state court litigation against citizens
of other states or nations. The federal structure of our polity turns out
to be a formidable obstacle to the implementation of such a regime.
The Article concludes with a postscript that critiques the Court's most
recent jurisdictional due process decision, Burnham v. Superior
Court.3 5
I. EXPLAINING THE MINIMUM CONTACTS DOCTRINE
A. The Distinction Between Citizens and Noncitizens
Years before it first enunciated the minimum contacts doctrine,
the Supreme Court embraced a rule, which persists today, that when a
government orders one of its own citizens to attend court, the order is
features of minimum contacts doctrine should be discarded in favor of a regime in
which state courts are permitted to exercise jurisdiction if the state is an
appropriate forum according to criteria employed in typical venue provisions).
32. Thus, the test comports at least to an extent with Professor Weintraub's view
that jurisdictional due process doctrine should not be preoccupied with the
character of the relationship between the forum state and the noncitizen
defendant. See generally Weintraub, supra note 8 (proposing that the
requirement of a nexus between forum state and defendant should be rejected in
favor of multi-factored inquiry that focuses on fairness to the defendant under all
circumstances).
33. Professors Drobak and Weintraub, among others, argue that jurisdictional due
process should be regarded in part as a surrogate for constitutional limits on
choice of law. John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction,
68 IowA L. REV. 1015, 1058 (1983); Weintraub, supra note 8, at 524-25.
34. See, e.g., Kamp, supra note 28, at 47 ("Under the Court's [current approach to
jurisdictional due process], state lines can become barriers to jurisdiction in
situations where jurisdiction could be obtained under an analysis based solely on
questions of convenience"); Redish, supra note 8, at 1137 ("[Ihe only concern of
a principled due process jurisdictional analysis should be the avoidance of
inconvenience to defendant"); Weinberg, supra note 8, at 916 (arguing that
personal jurisdiction should turn on fair balancing of conveniences). Cf. Jay,
supra note 9, at 446 (observing that state lines are largely irrelevant in modern
commercial context, because companies as a practical matter hope for the widest
distribution of their products and would not restrict distribution to avoid
particular state forums).
35. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
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immune from jurisdictional due process attack.3 6 In Blackmer v.
United States,3 7 the Court upheld the jurisdiction of a federal court
over an American citizen residing abroad. A court in the District of
Columbia had issued two subpoenas requiring Blackmer, who was liv-
ing in Paris, to appear as a witness for the government in a criminal
trial. When Blackmer failed to comply with the subpoenas, which had
been served on him in France, the court fined him. Blackmer argued
in the Supreme Court that the lower court's exercise of jurisdiction
over him violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
but the Supreme Court rejected the contention:
While it appears that the petitioner removed his residence to France in the
year 1924, it is undisputed that he was, and continued to be, a citizen of the
United States. He continued to owe allegiance to the United States. By virtue
of the obligations of citizenship, the United States retained its authority over
him, and he was bound by its laws made applicable to him in a foreign coun-
try... It is... beyond controversy that one of the duties which the citizen
owes to his government is to support the administration of justice by attending
its courts and giving his testimony whenever he is properly summoned.
3 s
In Milliken v. Meyer,39 the Court made clear that the Blackmer
principle permitted a state court within the United States to exercise
jurisdiction over an absent citizen of the state in private civil litigation.
A Wyoming court had entered a default judgment against Meyer, a
Wyoming citizen who had been served with process in Colorado, in
litigation involving oil profits.40 Meyer brought an action in a Colo-
rado court to prevent the plaintiff in the Wyoming action from enforc-
ing the Wyoming judgment in Colorado. The Supreme Court held
that the Wyoming judgment was entitled to full faith and credit:
Domicile in the state is alone sufficient to bring an absent defendant within
the reach of the state's jurisdiction for purposes of a personal judgment by
means of appropriate substituted service.... As in case of the authority of the
United States over its absent citizens, the authority of a state over one of its
citizens is not terminated by the mere fact of his absence from the state. The
state which accords him privileges and affords protection to him and his prop-
erty by virtue of his domicile may also exact reciprocal duties.... One ...
incident of domicile is amenability to suit within the state even during
sojourns without the state, where the state has provided and employed a rea-
sonable method for apprising such an absent party of the proceedings against
him.4 1
The persistence of the Blackmer-Milliken rule in the minimum
contacts era, and the Court's specific invocation in the two cases of the
vocabulary of political legitimacy, are powerful confirmation of the
proposition that the minimum contacts doctrine flows from principles
36. Blackmer v. U.S., 284 U.S. 421, 438-39 (1932).
37. 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
38. 1& at 436-38.
39. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
40. Id at 458-59.
41. 1& at 462-64.
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of political legitimacy. When a state court summons a member of the
political community that created the court, the summons is politically
legitimate. When a state court summons an outsider, the political le-
gitimacy of the summons must be established in some other way, and
the minimum contacts doctrine is that other way.
B. Specific Jurisdiction and General Jurisdiction
Chief Justice Stone, writing for the International Shoe Court, in-
augurated the minimum contacts era in 1945:
[D]ue process requires ... that in order to subject a defendant to a [state court]
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum,
he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 42
The Chief Justice did not characterize the doctrine explicitly as flow-
ing from principles of political legitimacy, but neither did he flesh out
any other competing conception of the "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice" that might animate the doctrine. Instead of
deriving the minimum contacts doctrine from any particular abstract
theory of jurisdictional justice, he relied on the familiar bottom-up
method of common law reasoning, building the doctrine from the pat-
terns of facts and results in the Court's pre-1945 jurisdictional due pro-
cess cases.
He found in these precedents what might be described as a two-
dimensional matrix. One dimension of the matrix gauges the related-
ness of the noncitizen's contacts with the forum state to the claims
asserted in the litigation; the other dimension gauges the extensive-
ness of the contacts on a scale from a single, isolated contact to contin-
uous and systematic forum activity.43 A single, isolated contact can
justify an exercise of jurisdiction by a state court over a noncitizen if
the lawsuit is sufficiently related to the contact.44 Professors von
Mehren and Trautman introduced the term "specific jurisdiction" 45 to
refer to adjudicatory authority over disputes arising out of or suffi-
ciently connected with a noncitizen's forum contacts. On the other
hand, if a noncitizen's contacts with the forum state are sufficiently
extensive, the state's courts may summon the noncitizen to defend
lawsuits entirely unrelated to the contacts.46 Professors von Mehren
and Trautman coined the term "general jurisdiction" to refer to adju-
dicatory authority that extends to any sort of dispute.47
42. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)(quoting Millikan v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
43. See id. at 317-18.
44. Id. at 318.
45. Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1136 (1966).
46. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
47. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 43, at 1136.
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Specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction can be described as
flowing from principles of political legitimacy.48 What reasons, other
than an individual's membership in a polity, might justify a summons
to the individual from the polity's courts to answer a civil complaint?
One plausible reason is that the individual allegedly has caused harm
within the polity. A noncitizen who drives into a state and negligently
injures a citizen of that state no longer can claim honestly to be free of
any obligation to respond to a summons from the state's courts in an
action brought by the injured citizen. Specific jurisdiction flows from
this first reason.4 9 Another plausible reason is that the defendant,
although not formally a member of the polity, has established such a
close relationship with the polity that the defendant might be de-
scribed as a de facto member. A noncitizen business, for example, that
maintains substantial manufacturing facilities within a state and that
participates in the state's political life arguably loses its status as an
outsider. This second reason explains general jurisdiction.50
C. The Purposeful Availment Requirement
One can imagine, and some commentators have defended,51 an ap-
parently straightforward conception of political legitimacy in which
the presence of a state regulatory interest is a sufficient condition for
the extension of judicial power against a noncitizen. The minimum
contacts doctrine, however, implies a more complex conception. In
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,52 for example, the Court
ruled that an Oklahoma court lacked the authority to entertain a
products liability action against two noncitizens, despite the fact that
the automobile collision and fire that precipitated the litigation oc-
curred within Oklahoma's borders. The stumbling block to jurisdic-
tion in World-Wide Volkswagen was the so-called purposeful
availment requirement.5 3
The purposeful availment requirement became a pivotal feature of
48. Brilmayer et al., surra note 10, at 726-27.
49. Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 10, at 86 ("The most convincing justi-
fication [for the state court's exercise of authority over noncitizen] is [s]tate's
right to regulate activities occurring within the [s]tate."). See also Stein, supra
note 11, at 698 (observing that specific jurisdiction recognizes "state's legitimate
regulatory stake" in litigation "to redress a legal wrong committed or suffered
within the state").
50. Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 10, at 87 (observing that noncitizen's
systematic unrelated activity in forum suggests that noncitizen is enough of an
insider safely to be relegated to state's political processes). See also Stein, supra
note 11, at 758 (asserting that noncitizens who establish pervasive and systematic
contacts with forum legitimately can be treated as "constructive state citizens").
51. Stein, supra note 11; Weisburd, supra note 11.
52. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
53. Id- at 295-99.
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the Supreme Court's approach to jurisdictional due process in 1958.54
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority in Hanson v.
Denckla,55 stated that jurisdictional due process requires "in each case
that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails it-
self of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."5 6 The act must
be the noncitizen defendant's act: "The unilateral activity of those
who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot sat-
isfy the requirement of contact with the forum State."5 7 Moreover,
the noncitizen defendant's immunity from the forum state's grasp per-
sists even if the forum state is the center of gravity of the dispute, with
a clear interest in resolving it,58 and the defendant easily could partici-
pate in litigation there, incurring no meaningful inconvenience costs.5 9
Justice Brennan's 1985 opinion in Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz,60 the Court's most recent full-dress enunciation of the ele-
ments of jurisdictional due process, confirms that the purposeful avail-
ment requirement is an important gloss on the minimum contacts
doctrine and must be treated as a threshold requirement.61 If the
plaintiff has not demonstrated the noncitizen's purposeful minimum
contacts with the forum state, then a state court's exercise of authority
violates jurisdictional due process.6 2 Moreover, once a plaintiff estab-
54. See generally, Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
55. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). Professor Stein describes Hanson's introduction of the pur-
poseful availment requirement as a fundamental transformation of jurisdictional
due process doctrine. Stein, supra note 11, at 717.
56. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 235, 253 (1958).
57. Id.
58. IcL at 254. See also Stein, supra note 11, at 718 (reading Hanson as "conceptual
repudiation" of notion that regulatory need justifies jurisdiction and as founda-
tion for reigning view that jurisdiction is justified by defendant's voluntary sub-
mission to authority of forum state).
59. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 235, 251 (1958).
60. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
61. The opinion describes as "the constitutional touchstone" of modern jurisdictional
due process doctrine the question of whether the defendant purposefully has es-
tablished minimum contacts with the forum state. Id. at 474 (emphasis added).
62. Professor Stein sums up the Court's most recent cases as based on the proposition
that "[c]onvenience and forum interest apparently can divest a court of its pre-
sumptive authority, but they cannot establish jurisdiction absent the defendant's
purposeful availment." Stein, supra note 11, at 732. See also Earl M. Maltz, Sov-
ereign Authority, Fairness, and Personal Jurisdiction: The Case for the Doctrine
of Transient Jurisdiction, 66 WAsH U. L.Q. 671, 688 at n.83 (1988) (arguing that
Supreme Court never has found exercise of state court jurisdiction constitutional
in absence of purposeful availment, unless one counts Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), which involved plaintiff class members and not non-
resident defendants); Rex R. Perschbacher, Minimum Contacts Reapplied: Mr.
Justice Brennan Has It His Way in Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 1986 ARiz. ST.
L.J. 585, 597 (Hanson decision now seen as first in series of restrictive jurisdic-
tional due process decisions having as "[t]heir central feature... an insistence on
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lishes a noncitizen defendant's purposeful minimum contacts with the
forum state, the noncitizen can defeat jurisdiction only by marshaling
what Justice Brennan characterized in Burger King as a "compelling"
case against jurisdiction under a multi-factored balancing test weigh-
ing any burdens on the defendant against various countervailing con-
siderations, including the plaintiff's interest in a convenient forum
and the forum state's interest in resolving controversies flowing from
in-state events.63
The dominance of the purposeful availment requirement in the
modern jurisdictional due process regime does not defeat the project
of explaining the main features of the regime in terms of political le-
gitimacy. On the contrary, the central role played by the requirement
reinforces the notion that principles of political legitimacy drive the
doctrine. A famous idea in political philosophy, usually associated
with John Locke,64 is that government derives its legitimacy from the
consent of the governed.65 Analogously, a summons to a noncitizen
derives its legitimacy at least in part from the noncitizen's consent,66
manifested perhaps by the noncitizen's execution of a forum selection
clause in a contract 67 or by a decision not to object to personal jurisdic-
tion6s or through purposeful affiliation with the forum.69 No other
establishing purposeful and beneficial defendant-forum contacts before consider-
ing any other interests").
63. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).
64. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATisES OF GOVERNMENT 348 (P. Laslett 2d ed. 1967) (3d ed.
1968) (stating that a person cannot be subjected to political power of another
without person's consent).
65. Stewart, supra note 11, at 19; Trangsrud, supra note 11, at 885. Professor Trang-
srud emphasizes the importance of contractarian political legitimacy to American
political leaders in the late eighteenth century. Id. He quotes John Adams for
the proposition that "the only moral foundation of government is, the consent of
the people." Id. (quoting letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26,
1776), reprinted in 9 C. ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 375 (1854)).
66. Stewart, supra note 11, at 18; Trangsrud, supra note 11, at 889. But see Redish,
supra note 8, at 1125 (observing that the Court itself has not embraced explicitly
notion that contractarian conception of political legitimacy underlies minimum
contacts doctrine).
67. Trangsrud, supra note 11, at 895. See Stein, supra note 11, at 756 (recognizing
that individual is always free to subject himself or herself voluntarily to sover-
eign that otherwise would lack authority over individual).
68. Trangsrud, supra note 11, at 895.
69. Professor Stein describes the Court's modern jurisdictional due process cases as
recognizing "a contract-like justification" for the deployment of state court au-
thority against noncitizens. Stein, supra note 11, at 691. "[J]urisdiction satisfies
due process scrutiny when the defendant voluntarily enters into a relationship
with the sovereign and thereby confers upon the forum its jurisdictional author-
ity." Id. (footnote omitted). He locates the genesis of this contract-like justifica-
tion in Hanson and traces its development in the Court's modern round of
jurisdictional due process decisions. Id. at 717-33.
Professor Brilmayer, defending her political rights model of choice of law, ar-
gues that a polity should not be permitted to apply its own substantive law against
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person can obligate the noncitizen; the acts establishing the relation-
ship must be the noncitizen's acts. And a forum's strong interest in
issuing a summons to a noncitizen is no substitute for the noncitizen's
prior consent.
It might be objected that the "consent" associated with a nonci-
tizen's purposeful affiliation with a forum differs importantly from
the actual consent manifested by a noncitizen's execution of a forum
selection clause or calculated decision not to interpose an objection to
jurisdiction. The purposeful availment requirement attaches conse-
quences to a noncitizen's behavior whether or not the noncitizen
wishes the consequences to attach. A noncitizen cannot escape the au-
thority of a state court by announcing in advance that his or her pur-
poseful affiliation with the forum should not be taken as a
manifestation of consent. The minimum contacts doctrine therefore is
contractarian only in the limited sense that the noncitizen has a choice
whether to engage in the conduct that constitutes purposeful
availment.7 0
This objection makes the mistake of equating contractarian princi-
ples of political legitimacy with the ordinary rules of contract law.73
In contract law, no contract generally is formed if one party makes
clear that he or she objects to particular terms proposed by the other
contracting party. In contractarian political theory, however, a polity
may insist on a package deal. A person may choose to remain uncon-
nected with a polity. The choice is a genuine choice.72 But if a person
chooses to establish a relationship with a polity, then the polity legiti-
mately may attach certain consequences to the choice, whether or not
the person agrees term-by-term to the consequences. Contractarian
principles hardly permit a citizen of a state to pick and choose among
the obligations of citizenship, agreeing to fill out census question-
a noncitizen unless the noncitizen has engaged in "some sort of purposeful action
towards the territory" of the polity. Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of
Law, supra note 10, at 1307. The precondition of some "volitional act" directed
towards the polity guarantees that noncitizens, who "lack the opportunity to par-
ticipate in electoral processes" within the polity, will have some way, namely
"exit" rather than "voice," to "influence the legal norms that [govern their] be-
havior." Id (borrowing the terms "exit" and "voice" from ALBERT 0. HiRSCH-
MAN, Exrr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970)). See also BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION,
supra note 10, at 39 (declaring that it is simply not fair for state to exert authority
over individual who has not purposefully assented in any way).
70. Professor Stein makes this argument. See Stein, supra note 11, at 734-36.
71. See Trangsrud, supra note 11, at 893-94 (distinguishing between "the bargained-
for exchange of consideration and formal assent characteristic of our private law
of contract" and "broader theory of political consent").
72. Stewart, supra note 11, at 18 (recognizing that by choosing to act within forum,
noncitizen does choose to affiliate to some degree with sovereign entity); Trang-
srud, supra note 11, at 890 (characterizing purposeful affiliation as "free and
knowing" choice to establish relationship with state).
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naires, but refusing to pay taxes. 73 Similarly, a noncitizen who
chooses to establish a relationship with a state must accept the juris-
dictional consequences of the choice, so long as the state satisfies other
applicable principles of political legitimacy in imposing the
consequences.
II. THE PRIVATE LAW PARADIGM
The legitimacy theory gives a superficially satisfying coherence to
the Court's jurisdictional due process project. The Due Process Clause
protects persons from states. Defendants who are citizens of other
states or nations need protection from politically illegitimate projec-
tions of state judicial power. The minimum contacts doctrine accords
this protection. The coherence,-however, is a false coherence. It is a
coherence within the flawed public law paradigm of state court juris-
diction. In ordinary private litigation, the problem of state court juris-
diction is not a problem of public law in the conventional sense. The
jurisdictional antagonists are not the forum state and the noncitizen
defendant, but the plaintiff and the noncitizen defendant. The plain-
tiff, taking advantage of the litigation initiative that belongs to all
plaintiffs, determines the initial forum for the lawsuit simply by filing
a complaint in the courts of a particular state.74 The summons that
the forum state issues to the defendant represents nothing more really
than the state's willingness to supply a forum.
If, for example, the plaintiffs in the World-Wide Volkswagen case
had decided to bring their products liability action in New York in-
stead of Oklahoma because they thought they could secure a larger
verdict in New York, no Oklahoma legal officer likely would have ap-
peared in the New York action to seek to force the litigation into an
Oklahoma court,7 5 despite the fact that Oklahoma, as the place where
73. Cf. Stein, supra note 11, at 708-09 (criticizing contractarian account of political
legitimacy in general on ground that state authority does not depend on consent
of each individual within state's borders and "individual can no more claim im-
munity from sovereign authority because of lack of consent than a driver can
claim immunity from the speed limit because [driver] voted against the incum-
bent party").
74. Justice Frankfurter noted the "enormous 'discrimination' inherent in our system
of litigation, whereby the sole choice of forum, from among those where service is
possible and venue unobjectionable, is placed with the plaintiff." Hoffman v.
Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 365-66 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). "The plaintiff,"
he continued, "may choose from among these forums at will." IMi at 366.
75. This practical indifference also undermines the theory that jurisdictional due
process should protect against what might be called judicial aggrandizement-the
deployment of judicial power by one state at the expense of a second state. Judi-
cial aggrandizement is a theoretically available rationale in any federal republic
for nationally imposed limits on state court jurisdiction. "To the extent that one
state's judicial control over a legal controversy is increased, the control of all
other states over that controversy is diminished." Philip B. Kurland, The
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the plaintiffs suffered their injuries, theoretically could claim a regu-
latory interest in supplying the forum. If the plaintiffs, when they
purchased their car in New York, had entered into a forum selection
Supreme Cour the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of
State Courts, 25 U. CH. L. REv. 569, 569 (1958).
An exercise of jurisdiction might be at the expense of a second state in either
of two senses. First, the second state might be a polity with a strong cultural
identity and distinct values, and therefore might regard an exercise of jurisdiction
by the first state, even in private litigation, as an illegitimate intrusion into the
affairs of the second state's political family. Such a state might insist, for exam-
ple, that adoptions of the state's children be handled only through its courts ac-
cording to its laws. In 1978, for example, Congress enacted legislation recognizing
the exclusive jurisdiction of Indian tribal courts over adoption proceedings in-
volving reservation-domiciled Indian children. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978,
25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1988). The legislation reflects Congress's judgment that state
courts lack appreciation for Indian cultural values. Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 45 (1989). Moreover, the legislation embraces
the proposition that the tribe itself has an interest, separate from the parents'
interest, in preserving the integrity of the tribe by preventing the wholesale adop-
tion of Indian children by non-Indians. Id. at 49-53.
Second, even a state without any strong cultural identity or distinct values
might view ordinary civil litigation as partly public in character, with the plaintiff
serving as a private attorney-general, acting not only to protect his or her own
interests, but to promote such state interests as the encouragement of promise-
keeping and the deterrence of dangerous conduct. See Louise Weinberg, Against
Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53, 70-71 (1991). Such a state might insist that any lawsuit
arising from events that occurred within the borders of the state should be tried
in the state's courts and according to its laws in order to ensure that the public
objectives of the state's system of civil litigation are promoted.
Despite the cultural convergence of the United States, the individual states, or
at least some of them, might be described as having distinct cultures and values.
Professor Brilmayer has called attention to the continuing significance of state
lines:
Maine has a different character than Texas, Nevada emphasizes differ-
ent values than South Carolina, and San Franciscans complain bitterly
about how their skyline comes more and more to resemble that of New
York. Northern and Southern Californians joke about dividing the state
in two precisely because it is thought that statehood appropriately re-
flects value choices, and two such different cultures are incongruously
joined into a single state.
Brilmayer, Shaping and Sharing, supra note 10, at 408. See also Perdue, supra
note 20, at 517 (arguing that states even today retain importance beyond being
political subunits and to some extent can be described as mechanisms for "recog-
nition of social and cultural group differences") (quoting Howard C. Hunter, Fed-
eralism and State Taxation of Multistate Enterprises, 32 EMORY L.J. 89 130
(1983)). The differences from state to state are not so pronounced or keenly felt
that they generate any real state-based insistence on federal supervision of state
court authority over noncitizens to keep certain matters within the political fam-
ily. Moreover, there is little evidence that the states regard it as crucial that ordi-
nary civil lawsuits arising from events within a particular state's borders be tried
in the courts of that state according to its laws in order to ensure the promotion of
such state interests as the encouragement of promise-keeping and the deterrence
of dangerous conduct. As Professor Louise Weinberg has noted, "[a] defendant
may not want to be sued in the forum of the plaintiff's choice, but to suppose that
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agreement with the defendants, specifying that any disputes would be
resolved in the courts of New York, the clause likely would have been
enforceable, despite Oklahoma's theoretical interest.76 And if the
plaintiffs and the defendants had settled their case, Oklahoma as a
polity would not have insisted on scrutinizing the settlement to be
sure that the state's separate interest was being served adequately. In
fact, if the World-Wide Volkswagen plaintiffs had decided to sue in
New York or to settle on terms agreeable to all the parties, or if the
defendants had demanded adherence to a forum selection agreement,
the only Oklahomans who likely would have cared at all would have
been pleased to have the additional space on an Oklahoma docket.77
It accords more with the reality of ordinary private litigation,
therefore, to describe the place-of-trial problem in World-Wide Volk-
swagen not in vertical terms, as a state-defendant confrontation, but in
horizontal terms, as a plaintiff-defendant confrontation, with the issue
properly framed as whether the plaintiffs, consistent with the most
there is some other state with a burning desire to take the plaintiff's case is to
indulge in fantasy." Weinberg, supra note 8, at 924.
At any rate, the Court now has laid to rest the notion that the Due Process
Clause separately protects states from other states:
It is true that we have stated [in World-Wide Volkswagen] that the re-
quirement of personal jurisdiction, as applied to state courts, reflects an
element of federalism and the character of state sovereignty vis-a-vis
other States.... The restriction on state sovereign power described in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a
function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process
Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction re-
quirement and the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism con-
cerns. Furthermore, if the federalism concept operated as an
independent restriction on the sovereign power of the court, it would not
be possible to waive the personal jurisdiction requirement: Individual ac-
tions cannot change the powers of sovereignty, although the individual
can subject himself to powers from which he may otherwise be
protected.
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie de Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-
03 n.10 (1982).
76. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
77. Professor Weisburd criticizes the result in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodsen,
444 U.S. 286 (1980), on the ground that because the defendants should be subject
to criminal jurisdiction in Oklahoma for causing harm there, they should be sub-
ject to civil jurisdiction as well. Weisburd, supra note 11, at 405-06. When a state
exercises criminal jurisdiction, however, its interest in the litigation is real and
powerful. The same is true in some sorts of civil cases, such as litigation brought
by a state to collect state taxes. It is worth noting that the case that launched the
minimum contacts era was not ordinary private litigation, but an action by a state
to collect from the corporate defendant contributions to an unemployment insur-
ance fund. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 311-13 (1945). Cf.
ALAN WATSON, ROMAtN LAW AND COMPARATrvE LAw 97 (1991) (asserting that
lesson of history is that over most of field of law, and especially of private law,
political rulers need have no interest in determining what rules of law are or
should be, provided that revenues roll in and public peace is kept).
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attractive principles of place-of-trial justice between the parties, were
entitled to impose the Oklahoma forum on the defendants. The legiti-
macy theory and the minimum contacts doctrine, with their single-
minded public law focus on the relationship between the forum state
and the noncitizen defendant, lack an adequate normative vocabulary
for doing place-of-trial justice between the parties.
This Article therefore proposes as an alternative to the minimum
contacts doctrine a significant relationship test that takes as its start-
ing point the horizontal symmetry of the problem of place-of-trial jus-
tice. Comparable in some ways to the approach to choice of law
recommended by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,78 the
significant relationship test would permit a plaintiff initially to impose
on the defendant any state forum with a significant relationship to the
dispute and the parties to the dispute. The test also would permit the
defendant to trump the plaintiff's choice in favor of a forum with a
substantially closer relationship to the dispute and the parties to the
dispute, but not if other factors such as the relative litigational abili-
ties of the parties justified the plaintiff's original choice. Like the
78. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(1)(1971) ("The
rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined
by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most signifi-
cant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.... ."). Because the significant
relationship test tracks so closely a particular approach to conflict-of-laws, it
should be attractive to those critics of the minimum contacts doctrine who argue
that if a state would be entitled to apply its own substantive law to resolve a
dispute, then a fortiori the state should be entitled to serve as the forum. Linda J.
Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 88 (1978)
("[i]f a court has the power to apply its own law, it should have the power to
exercise jurisdiction over the action"); Stein, supra note 11, at 752-53 ("When the
forum would be justified in applying its own law to the activity questioned by the
lawsuit, it also should have the authority to adjudicate.")(footnote omitted). Cf.
Weintraub, supra note 8, at 525 (arguing that when the law of forum is "so clearly
the appropriate law to resolve the dispute that it would be the law chosen not
only by the forum's conflicts rules, but also by the conflicts rules of all other
states that have contacts with the parties or with the transaction," then "choice of
forum law becomes a cogent reason for permitting litigation in the forum.").
In a number of its jurisdictional due process opinions, the Court has admon-
ished that the question whether a state would be entitled to apply its own law in
resolving a dispute and the question whether the state may serve as the forum are
separate issues. A state that would be entitled to apply its own law nevertheless
may lack the authority under the Due Process Clause to serve as the forum.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 (1977) ("[The Court has] rejected the argu-
ment that if a State's law can properly be applied to a dispute, its courts necessar-
ily have jurisdiction over the parties to that dispute). Professor Silberman, for
one, finds this "counterintuitive." Silberman, supra, at 82. "To believe that a
defendant's contacts with the forum state should be stronger under the [D]ue
[P]rocess [C]lause for jurisdictional purposes than for choice of law is to believe
that an accused is more concerned with where he will be hanged than whether."
Id. at 88.
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"most significant relationship" 79 test incorporated in the Restate-
ment's choice of law rules, the significant relationship test for state
court jurisdiction would look to such factors as the places where rele-
vant events occurred; the citizenship, residence, and places of business
of the parties; and the place or places where the relevant relationships
between or among the parties were clustered.
A. The Symmetry of Place-of-Trial Justice
The minimum contacts doctrine is asymmetrical. It focuses only
on the question of whether the defendant purposefully has established
the right sort of relationship with the forum state. The plaintiff and
the defendant, however, share the same place-of-trial concerns. If the
plaintiff is not entitled to impose on the defendant a wholly alien fo-
rum for the resolution of their dispute, neither is the defendant enti-
tled to impose such a forum on the plaintiff.8 0 If, for example, a life-
long South Carolina citizen is injured in South Carolina by a widget
manufactured by a Massachusetts company, and if the South Carolin-
ian cannot sue the company in a South Carolina court because the
company has established no purposeful affiliation with South Caro-
lina, then the South Carolinian is forced as a practical matter to seek
justice in Massachusetts. But there is no more reason, focusing only
on the relationships between parties and polities, to impose the Massa-
chusetts litigation package on the plaintiff than there is to impose the
South Carolina litigation package on the defendant. The significant
relationship test recognizes this symmetry and allows consideration
not only of the defendant's relationship with the forum chosen by the
plaintiff, but also of the plaintiff's relationship with the forum where
the defendant would have the dispute resolved.
If the Court had embraced the notion that borders matter as much
and in the same ways to plaintiffs and defendants, a number of its
modern jurisdictional due process decisions might have come out dif-
79. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971).
80. Professor Brilmayer has discussed the idea of the symmetry of the imperative of
political legitimacy:
If the defendant is sued in a distant forum, then he is faced with a choice
between litigation and default. The plaintiff is faced with a similar
choice if he cannot sue in his chosen forum. Thus, in some fact situa-
tions, the plaintiff would be able to argue that being forced to litigate in
another forum violates his rights because he has no minimum contacts
with the alternative forum. Denying jurisdiction puts him to the choice
between litigation in a forum with which he has no contacts and default-
ing in his claim. The harm which the defendant would suffer if jurisdic-
tion were granted is no more serious than the harm that the plaintiff
would suffer if it is denied.
Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 10, at 110. See also Perdue, supra
note 20, at 517-18 (asserting that if argument from political morality works for
defendants, it should work for plaintiffs as well).
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ferently. An example is Shaffer v. Heitner. In Shaffer, a noncitizen of
Delaware brought a shareholder's derivative action in Delaware's
courts against present and former officers and directors of a Delaware-
chartered corporation.8 ' The Shaffer majority concluded that the Due
Process Clause prohibited the Delaware courts from exercising juris-
diction over the defendants.82 The plaintiff had argued that the litiga-
tion should occur in Delaware because of the state's strong interest in
the affairs of corporations holding Delaware charters.83 The Court re-
jected the argument, concluding first that Delaware had not expressed
such an interest clearly84 and second that the presence of a strong
state interest is no substitute for a defendant's contacts with the
state.8 5 Justice Marshall wrote for the majority that the defendants
"have simply had nothing to do with the State of Delaware."8 6
Within the mono-dimensional public law paradigm, it was enough
for Justice Marshall to examine only the relationships between the
defendants and Delaware. If what matters, however, is place-of-trial
justice between the parties, then the Court also should have examined
the relationships, if any, between the plaintiff and the forums identi-
fied as appropriate by the defendants. If the plaintiff could not sue in
Delaware, and if the plaintiff therefore was compelled to follow some
or all of the defendants to their home polities, then the plaintiff as a
practical matter was required to seek justice under judicial regimes
probably at least as alien to the plaintiff as Delaware's courts were to
the defendants. Within the private law paradigm, therefore, Justice
Marshall's point that the defendants "have simply had nothing to do
with the State of Delaware" is hardly telling, even if accurate. In a
particular case, if it really is true that there is no forum with which
both parties have some significant relationship, then the answer
should not be that the defendant's concerns about borders automati-
cally count more than the plaintiff's, but instead that the place of trial
should be determined according to other factors.
Another of the Court's modern jurisdictional due process decisions
that might have come out differently if the Court had been operating
within the private law paradigm is Helicopteros Nationales de Colom-
bia, S.A. v. Hall.8 7 The plaintiffs in the Helicopteros case were rela-
tives of American construction workers who died in a helicopter crash
in Peru.8 8 The relatives brought an action in a Texas court against a
number of defendants, including the Colombian company that oper-
81. 433 U.S. at 189-90.
82. 1& at 216-17.
83. I& at 214.
84. Id at 214-15.
85. Id, at 215.
86. Id at 216.
87. I& at 409-10.
88. Helicopteros Nationales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
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ated the helicopter.8 9 Neither the plaintiffs nor their decedents were
citizens of Texas,90 but the decedents had been hired in Texas by a
consortium headquartered in Houston to work on a project in Peru.91
The consortium had contracted with the Colombian company to pro-
vide helicopter transportation for the project.92 Officials of the Co-
lombian company had negotiated the contract in Texas, and then the
parties had executed it in Peru. The Colombian company also had
other contacts with Texas, having purchased helicopters there, and
having sent its employees to Texas for flight training and related
activities. 93
The Helicopteros majority treated the case as a general jurisdiction
case and concluded that the Colombian company lacked the continu-
ous and systematic contacts with Texas necessary to support general
jurisdiction.94 If the Court, instead of focusing single-mindedly on the
character of the relationship between the defendant company and
Texas, had implemented instead the significant relationship test, the
Court might have concluded that the Texas court was a permissible
forum. Again, there is no reason inherently to prefer a defendant's
interest in avoiding alien forums over the plaintiff's parallel interest.
If it matters whether the Colombian company had sufficiently sub-
stantial contacts with Texas, then it should matter equally whether
the plaintiffs had sufficiently substantial contacts with Peru and Co-
lumbia, because the Court's decision as a practical matter relegated
the plaintiffs to the courts of those nations.
B. Relative vs. Absolute Place-of-Trial Justice
The minimum contacts doctrine implies an absolutist conception of
place-of-trial justice. An exercise of state court jurisdiction either is
or is not politically legitimate, and if it is not, then it is unconstitu-
tional, regardless of what else might be said in its favor. The signifi-
cant relationship test, on the other hand, accommodates the rival
notion that an exercise of state court jurisdiction can be just, or more
nearly just, as between the parties not because it satisfies any absolute
standard of purposeful minimum contacts, but because the relation-
ship of all of the parties to the forum state is relatively closer than is
the relationship of the parties to any other potential forum. In Shaf-
fer, for example, the Delaware forum apparently did not meet the
Court's absolute standard of political legitimacy, but the plaintiff and
the defendants shared a relationship with Delaware, the corporation's
89. I& at 412.
90. I& at 411-12.
91. I& at 412.
92. Id- at 410.
93. Id- at 411.
94. Id- at 415-16.
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chartering state, that they did not share with any other state, except
perhaps the state of the corporation's principal place of business.95 A
shared relationship with a forum should count much more toward
place-of-trial justice than should the unilateral relationship between
any single party and any other potential forum.
The significant relationship test is sensitive in another way to the
intensities of the shared connections between the parties and the fo-
rum state. The test permits the defendant to veto a state forum se-
lected by the plaintiff, even if the forum can claim some connection to
the parties and the dispute, if there is another available forum with a
much closer connection to the parties and the dispute. If the Court's
Helicopteros decision can be justified within the private law para-
digm,96 the justification is that the Colombian company was entitled to
veto the Texas forum, despite the parties' shared relationship with
Texas, because the parties shared a much stronger relationship with
Peru. There is no doubt that the parties held in common in a signifi-
cant way a connection with Texas, because the Texas consortium was
the hub of the relationships that connected the plaintiffs' fate to the
competence of the defendant. On the other hand, the project was a
project in Peru. Arguably, at least, Peru was the strong center of
gravity of the events that led to the litigation.
A modem jurisdictional due process decision that probably can be
justified using the notion of the defendant's veto is World-Wide Volk-
swagen. The World-Wide Volkswagen plaintiffs were citizens of New
York, albeit on their way to a new home in Arizona, when they sus-
tained the injuries that provoked their lawsuit,97 and the two defend-
ants who challenged the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma forum also were
citizens of New York.9 8 These parties, then, shared a close relation-
ship with New York that they did not share with Oklahoma or with
any other state. Moreover, the transaction that laid the groundwork
for the plaintiffs' products liability lawsuit against the defendants-
the purchase of the automobile that later burned on an Oklahoma
highway-occurred in New York while the plaintiffs were New York
citizens.99 It makes considerable sense, then, to require the plaintiffs
to sue in the courts of the polity that, until just before the Oklahoma
events, the plaintiffs and the defendants had held so closely in com-
mon,10 0 and to prohibit the plaintiffs from imposing on the defendants
the courts of a political community that neither the plaintiffs nor the
95. See Weintraub, supra note 8, at 493 (arguing that it is fair to compel directors of
corporation to respond to stockholder's derivative suit in state of incorporation).
96. My own view is that the decision cannot be justified. See infra notes 107-10 and
accompanying text (discussing the importance of relative litigational ability).
97. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (1980).
98. Id at 288-89.
99. Id at 288.
100. Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 10, at 110.
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defendants ever called home and with which the plaintiffs and the de-
fendants had only the most attenuated and fortuitous connection. 101
C. Weighing State Regulatory Interests in the Balance
There is the argument, of course, that Oklahoma, as the place
where the automobile fire occurred, had a regulatory interest in serv-
ing as the forum for the products liability litigation, and some critics of
the minimum contacts doctrine have insisted on the deceptively sim-
ple proposition that the existence of such a regulatory interest is a
sufficient condition for the extension of state judicial power.' 02 Theo-
retically, the significant relationship test could accommodate the view
of these critics and permit a plaintiff always to impose on the defend-
ant the courts of a state with a regulatory interest in resolving the
parties' dispute. This, however, would be to indulge the fiction that in
ordinary private litigation the problem of state court jurisdiction is a
three-cornered problem in which a regulatory interest of the forum
state counts as much or more than the interests of the parties. The so-
called "interest" of a state like Oklahoma in providing a forum is
largely theoretical.103
A state where litigation-provoking events occurred often will
emerge under the significant relationship test as the most attractive
place of trial, but not because of the forum state's regulatory interest
in resolving disputes involving in-state events. If, for example, a citi-
zen of Iowa and a citizen of Alaska enter into a contract for the con-
struction of a building in New York, and a dispute arises about
performance of the contract, the plaintiff probably should be required
to litigate the dispute in New York as opposed to the plaintiff's home
polity. This is because New York is the only polity other than their
shared national polity that these two parties have in common. There
is no reason to permit the plaintiff to force the defendant into the
courts of the plaintiff's own political community, and conversely there
is no reason why the plaintiff automatically should be required to ac-
cept the litigation package offered by the defendant's home polity.
Members of a society operating behind a Rawlsian04 veil of ignorance,
unable to know whether they will wind up as plaintiffs or defendants
in such cases, probably would choose New York as the right answer to
the question of where the litigation should occur, not because New
York has a separate and dominant interest that must be respected, but
101. But see, e.g., Weintraub, supra note 8, at 505 (footnote omitted) (arguing that if
fairness to parties is criterion for jurisdictional justice then result in World-Wide
Volkswagen was wrong because forum state chosen by plaintiff was not unfair to
defendants).
102. Stein, supra note 11; Weisburd, supra note 11.
103. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
104. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971).
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because New York is the center of gravity of the parties'
relationship.105
D. Weighing Other Factors in the Balance
Implicit in the notion that an exercise of state court jurisdiction
can be more or less just, given the character of the relationships be-
tween the parties and the forum state, is the further notion that the
parties' relationships with the forum state can be weighed against
other factors that contribute to or diminish the overall place-of-trial
justice of an extension of state judicial power. Some critics of the min-
imum contacts doctrine have maintained that the Court's preoccupa-
tion with the question of contacts between the defendant and the
forum state has eclipsed other factors that deserve serious considera-
tion in the jurisdictional calculus.1 06 One factor emphasized in the
literature is the relative litigational ability of the parties in particular
classes of litigation.1o7 In products liability litigation, for example, it
should matter that defendants tend to be companies08 represented by
liability insurance carriers that operate nationally and that can call
upon a national network of defense counsel, 109 but that plaintiffs tend
to be individuals who lack litigation resources of their own and must
rely on the contingent fee system.11 0 It is this factor of relative litiga-
tional ability that persuades me, at least, that the Helicopteros plain-
tiffs should have been permitted to litigate in Texas, despite the
105. Cf. Harold S. Lewis, Jr., A Brave New World for Personal Jurisdiction: Flexible
Tests Under Uniform Standards, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1, 8 (1984) (stating that a fo-
rum state interest should be irrelevant to jurisdictional analysis because if forum
is fair, lack of strong state interest should not matter, and if forum is unfair,
present of strong state interest should not make it fair).
106. See, e.g., von Mehren, supra note 8.
107. von Mehren, supra note 8, at 320.
108. See, e.g., Jay, supra note 9, at 446-47 (stating that defendants should not be able to
hide within their state boundaries when they have used entire country as free
trade zone and in process have visited injury on persons who do not enjoy eco-
nomic fortunes derived from substantial interstate business operations).
109. Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L.
REV. 85, 108 (1983) (lamenting Court's failure in modern jurisdictional due pro-
cess cases to appreciate significance of fact that most tort defendants are covered
by liability insurance and so are represented by insurance carriers that are multi-
state actors); Weinberg, supra note 8, at 923 (footnote omitted)(noting that most
tort litigation is conducted by insurers "doing business nationwide, for whom no
state forum is inconvenient").
110. See Jay, supra note 9, at 446 (stating that given physical distance between modern
manufacturers/distributors and their ultimate buyers, danger of uncompensated
loss to consumers is very real unless plaintiffs can compel attendance of defend-
ants in reasonable forum); von Mehren, supra note 8, at 311 (suggesting that
traditional jurisdictional solicitude for defendants might be reversed in actions
brought by consumers, who are generally less able than their corporate oppo-
nents to afford distant litigation).
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argument that the connections between the parties and Peru were
much stronger in some ways than the connections between the parties
and Texas. Another factor is the desirability in complex multistate
disputes of providing some single forum in which all claims against all
parties can be resolved at once."' In shareholder litigation like Shaf-
fer, for example, there is good reason to try to make available to the
plaintiff a court in which all of the allegedly responsible officers and
directors of the company can be sued.
The significant relationship test accommodates these other factors,
so long as they are not treated as trumps. A forum is not automati-
cally just as between the parties merely because the defendant is bet-
ter able to afford litigating there, or because the plaintiff ought to
have one place in which to sue every potential defendant. The factors
should be considered as part of an overall inquiry into place-of-trial
justice that focuses primarily on parties-polities relationships. More-
over, pro-plaintiff factors are not the only additional factors that de-
serve consideration. On the other side of the ledger, there is the
argument that a plaintiff, all other factors being equal, should be re-
quired to litigate in the courts of the defendant's home polity not be-
cause of any principle of political legitimacy, but as a means of
discouraging the plaintiff from bringing a very weak or flatly un-
founded claim in the hope of securing a nuisance settlement.112
E. Between-the-Chairs Jurisdiction
Adoption of the significant relationship test would eliminate an an-
alytical difficulty that has developed under the minimum contacts re-
gime in cases that seem to fall between the chairs of specific and
general jurisdiction.13 A recent example is Doe v. National Medical
Services."4 In National Medical Services, the Tenth Circuit ruled
111. Hazard, supra note 8, at 714-15; Kamp, supra note 28, at 46; von Mehren, supra
note 8, at 332.
112. Cf. Kamp, supra note 28, at 50 (speculating that a reason for the Court's tilt to-
ward defendants in such cases as World-Wide Volkswagen is to protect defend-
ants against nuisance suits that take advantage of great distances and other such
factors to up the odds for the hapless defendants).
113. For an illuminating colloquy about this problem, see Brilmayer, Related Contacts,
supra note 10; Mary Twitchell, A Rebinder to Professor Brilmayer, 101 HARV. L.
REv. 1465 (1988); Twitchell, supra note 94. See also Lewis, supra note 103, at 34-
38 (arguing that courts should be free to blend related and unrelated contacts in
cases in which related contacts would not support specific jurisdiction and unre-
lated contacts would not support general jurisdiction); William M. Richman, Re-
view Essay, Part I-Casad's Jurisdiction in Civil Actions; Part I1-A Sliding
Scale to Supplement the Distinction Between General and Specific Jurisdiction,
72 CAL. L. REv. 1328, 1341-43 (1984)(jurisdiction should be proper when facts
amount to near miss on both general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction
paradigms).
114. 974 F.2d 143 (10th Cir. 1992).
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that a Colorado state court would lack jurisdiction over a Penn-
sylvania drug-testing company in an action brought by a Colorado citi-
zen alleging negligent testing and defamation.115 After testing
positive for drug use, the plaintiff had been dismissed from his job as a
hospital nurse.116 The hospital had obtained urine samples from the
plaintiff and had sent the samples to a California company for testing.
The California company in turn had engaged the Pennsylvania com-
pany to conduct the tests. The Pennsylvania company had reported
the positive results to the California company, and the California com-
pany then had conveyed the information to the hospital.
The Tenth Circuit decided that a Colorado court would lack spe-
cific jurisdiction over the Pennsylvania company because the plain-
tiff's lawsuit did not arise out of and was not sufficiently related to any
contacts between the company and the State of Colorado.1l 7 The com-
pany had received the samples from California and had sent the re-
sults to California and no evidence in the record tended to establish
even the company's awareness that the samples had originated in Col-
orado. The court also rejected the contention that a Colorado court
could exercise general jurisdiction over the company. 1 8 The record
showed that the company had conducted almost 3,500 tests for four
Colorado clients over a five-year period,119 but the court concluded
that the company "could not reasonably anticipate being haled into
court in Colorado for matters unrelated to its contacts with the Colo-
rado clients."120
Under the significant relationship test, a Colorado court would be
permitted to entertain the plaintiff's action. Again, there is no reason
to prefer the company's interest in avoiding alien forums over the
plaintiff's parallel interest. Colorado was not a wholly alien polity
from the company's point of view, given the substantial business the
company conducted with Colorado customers. On the other hand,
there is no reason to believe that Pennsylvania was anything other
than an alien polity from the plaintiff's point of view. There were sig-
nificant relationships between Colorado and the parties and between
Colorado and the dispute, and neither Pennsylvania nor any other
state apparently could claim any substantially closer relationships.
Moreover, permitting the plaintiff to proceed against the Penn-
sylvania company in Colorado would help ensure that the plaintiff
could sue in one forum not only the Pennsylvania company, but the
115. I- at 146.
116. I& at 144.
117. I& at 145-46.
118. 1& at 146.
119. I& at 145.
120. Id. at 146.
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hospital and the California company with which the hospital had
contracted.
F. The Fairness Factors Analysis
While the minimum contacts doctrine is the dominant component
of the Court's modern approach to jurisdictional due process, it is not
the only component. As Justice Brennan made clear in his Burger
King opinion,' 2 ' a state court summons that passes muster under the
minimum contacts doctrine remains vulnerable if the defendant can
make a compelling case against jurisdiction under a multi-factored
balancing test. This test weighs any burdens on the defendant against
various countervailing considerations, including the plaintiffs interest
in a convenient forum and the forum state's interest in resolving con-
troversies flowing from in-state events.122
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,12 3 the Court in-
voked this fairness factors test to condemn an exercise of jurisdiction
by a California court. The Asahi case began as a products liability ac-
tion brought by a person injured in a motorcycle accident caused by an
explosion in the motorcycle's rear tire. 24 The plaintiff sued, among
others, the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tire tube, and the tube
manufacturer then impleaded the Japanese manufacturer of the
tube's valve assembly. All of the claims in the case eventually were
settled except for the indemnity claim asserted by the Taiwanese com-
pany against the Japanese company. The Court ruled in Asahi that
the California court's retention of the indemnity claim was constitu-
tionally unreasonable. 125 Justice O'Connor noted in her opinion that
the Japanese defendant would be forced to cope with a distant and
foreign legal system in litigating an indemnity claim arising from a
transaction that took place in Taiwan regarding a product shipped
from Japan to Taiwan.126 She noted as well that California's interest
in resolving the indemnity claim was slight.127
Asahi almost surely would have come out the same way under the
significant relationship test. Taiwan's relationship with the two Asian
companies and with their indemnity dispute easily eclipsed Califor-
nia's very attenuated relationship, and the Japanese defendant there-
fore could have invoked the defendant's veto to defeat California's
extension of judicial power. There might be cases, however, in which
two forums receive relatively equal scores under the significant rela-
121. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985).
122. Id at 477.
123. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
124. Id at 106.
125. Id at 113-14.
126. Id. at 114.
127. Id at 114-15.
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tionship test, but requiring the defendant to litigate in the forum cho-
sen by the plaintiff would impose on the defendant litigation burdens
so severe and disproportionate that they should be condemned as un-
reasonable. A comprehensive regime for doing place-of-trial justice
therefore should include, as a complement to the significant relation-
ship test, a fairness factors or forum non conveniens component to
deal with such cases.
G. The Minimum Contacts Doctrine Revisited
The two central features of the minimum contacts doctrine are
conspicuously missing from the significant relationship test. First, the
test includes no purposeful availment requirement. Second, the test
does not distinguish between specific and general jurisdiction. The
reason for these omissions is quite simple. It is possible to fashion an
attractive formula for place-of-trial justice without them. What mat-
ters most is not the purposefulness of the parties' "actions or the relat-
edness or extensiveness of any single party's contacts with the forum
state, but the extent to which the parties share a relationship with the
forum state and with other potential forums for the resolution of their
dispute. Moreover, the significant relationship test would not permit a
plaintiff always to impose on a defendant, over the defendant's objec-
tion, the litigation package provided by the defendant's home state.
The defendant would be entitled to defeat the plaintiff's choice, as in
other cases, if the defendant could point to some other state with a
much stronger connection to the parties and their dispute.128
Perhaps the most powerful rhetorical ally of the minimum con-
tacts doctrine is the almost visceral conviction of many American law-
yers and judges that there is a critical difference between being forced
to litigate in a particular forum and choosing to litigate in the forum.
The defendant is forced; the plaintiff chooses. The reality, however, is
that the resolution of a jurisdictional dispute between a plaintiff and a
defendant always entails coercion. If the plaintiff's forum choice is
upheld, then the defendant is coerced. If the defendant's jurisdic-
tional objection is sustained, then the plaintiff as a practical matter is
forced either to give up the litigation altogether or to litigate in some
forum more to the defendant's liking. The dichotomy is not between
coercion and choice, but between brands of coercion. Moreover, this
Article accepts fully the proposition that a summons from a forum
state to a defendant is a serious matter that needs justification. Within
the private law paradigm, the summons is justified if the plaintiff is
justified in imposing the forum on the defendant.
128. Cf. Lewis, supra note 103, at 47-49 (drawing into question conventional notion
that "technical" domicile alone should support jurisdiction and arguing for multi-
factored inquiry designed to ensure fairness to the parties).
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III. THE PROBLEM OF IMPLEMENTATION
One of the consequences of the federal structure of our govern-
ment is the difficulty of implementing any private law regime gov-
erning the place of trial in state court litigation against citizens of
other states or nations. Federal implementation of the regime theo-
retically might be the most attractive strategy. Federal officials can be
expected to be even-handed in fashioning the limits of state court ju-
risdiction, at least in cases in which all of the litigants are citizens of
the United States, and in cases involving defendants who are citizens
of other nations, there is the alternative justification that we should
have a single national answer to the question of when plaintiffs should
be permitted to impose particular state forums on such persons. It is
axiomatic, however, that the Court has no general common law au-
thority in such matters. Moreover, it is far from clear that Congress
ever would turn its attention to the problem29 or that our constitu-
tional framework permits Congress to impose on the states a national
private law of the place of trial. No provision of the Constitution
unambiguously authorizes Congress to enact such legislation,1S0 and a
constitutional amendment conferring the appropriate authority on
Congress hardly would be likely to possess the political momentum
necessary to propel it through the rigorous Article V process.
The Court might embrace the private law paradigm not as federal
common law, but by abandoning the minimum contacts doctrine 3 1
129. See, e.g., Trangsrud, supra note 11, at 905 (noting that if Congress is too distracted
by other matters to legislate rules defining personal jurisdiction of federal courts,
Congress is even less likely to turn its attention to matters of state court
jurisdiction).
130. Professor Trangsrud has suggested that Congress has the power under the full
faith and credit clause to enact legislation governing the jurisdiction of state
courts over noncitizens. Trangsrud, supra note 11, at 903-05. Similarly, Professor
Ehrenzweig thought that federal legislation governing "interstate venue" proba-
bly would be constitutional under the full faith and credit clause. Albert A.
Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power"Myth and
Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 313 (1956). Cf. Robert H. Abrams and Paul
R. Dimond, Toward a Constitutional Framework for the Control of State Court
Jurisdiction, 69 MINN. L. REV. 75, 87-89 (1984)(arguing that Congress has the
power under the full faith and credit clause to enact jurisdictional legislation that
would serve as an instrument of interstate federalism, removing the temptation
for the Court to rely on the Due Process Clause to police federalism). What the
clause actually says is that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 1. Even if this language could support some conceivable congressional
regimes regulating the jurisdiction of state courts over noncitizens, it is at least
problematic whether the words can be made to license the enactment of a com-
prehensive regime for doing place-of-trial justice between the parties.
131. In imaginable circumstances, a state court's decision to exercise jurisdiction could
threaten a defendant's right to ordinary procedural due process. Howard M. Er-
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and inviting the states themselves to fashion appropriate long-arm leg-
islation, perhaps through the mechanism of the commissioners on uni-
form state laws. 132 The political analog of the idea of externalities in
microeconomic theory, however, argues against relying entirely on the
states themselves to apply jurisdictional rules fairly in litigation in-
volving noncitizen defendants. The states are not forced to take into
account directly the interests of these defendants, because a nonci-
tizen by definition has no vote in the forum state's elections and might
have little practical political clout within the forum state.133 Elected
ichson, Note, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in All Federal Question Cases: A
New Rule, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1117, 1151 (1989) (asserting that where inconven-
ience of forum is so extreme that defendant is effectively denied ability to litigate,
defendant's due process right of an opportunity to be heard may be violated);
Trangsrud, supra note 11, at 904 (noting that in unusual cases burden of litigating
in distant forum could be great enough to threaten noncitizen's ability to present
adequate defense). See Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on
State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretive Reexamination of the Full
Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part Two), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 735,
846 (1981)(jurisdictional due process should protect only against actual or con-
structive denials of defendant's right to be heard). A defense might depend cru-
cially, for example, on the live testimony of certain uncooperative witnesses, and
the witnesses might reside beyond the territorial limits of the court's power to
compel their attendance at a trial. Rhonda Wasserman, The Subpoena Power:
Pennoyer's Last Vestige, 74 MINN. L. REv. 37, 64 (1989) (stating that the inability
to obtain testimony of necessary witnesses may deprive defendant of meaningful
opportunity to be heard). See also Stewart, supra note 11, at 19 n.46 (noting that
the ability to compel attendance at trial of reluctant witnesses may be necessary
to fair resolution of dispute and witnesses may be located beyond subpoena power
of forum). In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), the Court
acknowledged the potential that a noncitizen defendant's crucial witnesses could
lie beyond the subpoena power of the forum, but the Court concluded that the
defendants in Burger King had failed to establish that the problem was a real one
for them. Id. at 483. If a defendant could establish that having to litigate in a
particular forum would threaten the defendant's right to an adequate hearing,
then the Court could intervene, deploying the uncontroversial procedural core of
due process doctrine.
132. There is now a uniform act for state court jurisdiction over noncitizens, but the
act reflects the reigning public law paradigm of state court jurisdiction. See UNIF.
INTERsTATE AND INT'L PRoc. AcT OF 1962, 13 U.L.A. 357 (Supp. 1993).
133. Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 10, at 34 (noting that domestic law is formulated
after consideration of opposing interests but in formulating jurisdictional stan-
dards state is unlikely to be moved by interests of out-of-state defendants, who
are not in position to influence legislature); Paul D. Carrington & James A. Mar-
tin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV.
227, 237 (1967)(arguing that courts should be solicitous of interests of nonresi-
dents in fashioning jurisdictional doctrine because nonresidents are unlikely to
enjoy leverage in lawmaking processes of state); Trangsrud, supra note 11, at 863
(stating that the risk of states asserting exorbitant theories of jurisdiction over
noncitizens is substantial because citizens demand convenient forums for litiga-
tion against noncitizens and noncitizens have no right and little opportunity to
encourage legislatures of other states to exercise restraint in conferring power on
their courts over noncitizens).
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state judges especially might be tempted to allow local plaintiffs to
impose on noncitizen defendants unjustly the litigational conse-
quences of the place of trial.134
Perhaps, then, the Court could rely on the states to fashion the
details of the private law regime through long-arm legislation, but
could police the states' application of the regime under the banner of
jurisdictional due process. Granted, the Due Process Clause is public
law, and the basic point of this Article is that the problem of state
court jurisdiction in ordinary private litigation is not a public law
problem in the conventional sense, but is instead essentially a private
law problem of enforcing place-of-trial justice between the parties. On
the other hand, there is a weak sense in which a jurisdictional problem
always is a problem of public law: The problem arises because of the
forum state's issuance of a summons. Jurisdictional due process in
general can be described at an abstract level as a means of ensuring
the constitutional reasonableness of a summons. It is a form of sub-
stantive due process.135 Under the Court's reigning approach to juris-
134. Justice Neely of West Virginia's highest court openly has conceded his preference
for in-state plaintiffs over out-of-state defendants in products liability cases: "As
long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from out-of-state companies to injured
in-state plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so. Not only is my sleep enhanced when I
give someone else's money away, but so is my job security, because the in-state
plaintiffs, their families, and their friends will reelect me." RICHARD NEELY, THE
PRODUCTS LiABmry MESS: How BuSINESs CAN BE RESCUED FROM STATE COURT
POLrIcs 4 (1988). Cf Walter Hellerstein, Some Reflections on the State Taxation
of a Nonresident's Personal Income, 72 MIcH. L. REv. 1309, 1338-39 (1974) (foot-
note omitted) (stating that when forced to choose between fairness to outsiders
and increased revenue for themselves, states have not unnaturally tended to give
themselves benefit of the doubt).
135. Interpreters of the Due Process Clause generally agree that it is at least a guaran-
tee of procedural regularity. "Many controversies have raged about the cryptic
and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a
minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication
be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of
the case." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
The controversial questions are whether the clause also protects other values be-
sides procedural fairness, and if it does, how the Justices should go about the task
of identifying these other, substantive values. John Hart Ely, in a well-known
attack on the notion of substantive due process, declared that the only proper role
of the Due Process Clause is to guarantee fair procedures. JOHN HART ELY, DE-
MOCRACY AND DISTRUST 20 (1980). See also ROBERT H. BORx, THE TEMPTING OF
AmERICA 32 (1990) (citing Ely with approval and maintaining that the text of the
Due Process Clause "simply will not support judicial efforts to pour substantive
rather than procedural meaning into it"). The Court, however, has embraced
substantive due process. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
Court interpreted the Due Process Clause as a guarantee that individuals could
make economic choices for themselves, free of constraints imposed by regulatory
legislation. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Pro-
cess, 40 STAN. L. REv. 379 (1988). In the late 1930's, the Court turned away from
economic substantive due process. Michael J. Phillips, Another Look at Economic
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dictional due process, the constitutional reasonableness of a summons
is defined in terms of political legitimacy and of overall fairness to the
defendant. Constitutional reasonableness could be redefined in terms
of place-of-trial justice between the parties.
IV. CONCLUSION: A BURNHAM POSTSCRIPT
Even limited reliance on the Due Process Clause is an imperfect
approach not only because it presses a mechanism of public law into
service to achieve essentially private law objectives, but because the
regime becomes hostage to more general concerns about the role of
the Court in applying the Due Process Clause. This risk is illustrated
nicely by the Court's most recent jurisdictional due process decision,
Burnham v. Superior Court. 36 In Burnham, the Court unanimously,
but without a majority opinion, rejected the argument that transient
jurisdiction violates jurisdictional due process. 37 "Transient" means
Substantive Due Process, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 265. The modern Court, however, has
not abandoned the basic proposition that the Due Process Clause protects sub-
stantive values. Instead, the Court has interpreted the clause as a guarantee of
certain non-economic rights, often but not always grouped under the heading of a
right to privacy. Michael J. Phillips, The Nonprivacy Applications of Substantive
Due Process, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 537 (1990). This modern, non-economic variety of
substantive due process finds support not only among the Justices, but in the
academy. See, e.g., Michael Wells & Thomas A. Eaton, Substantive Due Process
and the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 GA. L. REv. 201, 204 n.10 (1984).
The minimum contacts doctrine and the fairness factors analysis can be char-
acterized as substantive due process doctrine. In fact, Professor Perdue makes
the case that jurisdictional due process from the beginning has been a form of
substantive due process. She argues that Justice Field's opinion for the Court in
Pennoyer v. Neff was of a piece with his overall commitment to substantive due
process:
Field was the "pioneer and prophet" of the doctrine of substantive due
process. His opinions during the 1870's and 1880's, largely dissents and
concurrences, formed the foundation for the substantive due process ap-
proach later embraced in Lochner v. New York. Field's view was that
there were certain fundamental and inalienable rights. These rights
were not created by the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, the Four-
teenth Amendment provided the mechanism for protecting these rights
from intrusions by the states.... In the midst of Field's as yet unsuccess-
ful battle to use the Fourteenth Amendment as a weapon limiting state
power, Pennoyer v. Neff must have been a real bright spot.... Pennoyer
appears to be the first case in which a state action or statute was actually
invalidated and the Fourteenth Amendment was cited as a basis for such
invalidation.... [Field's] approach in Pennoyer parallels in several re-
spects his approach in other Fourteenth Amendment cases. First, and
most basically, the focus is not on concerns about fairness to the particu-
lar defendant, but instead is on the inherent limitations on the power of
governments.
Perdue, supra note 20, at 503-05 (footnotes omitted).
136. 495 U.S. 604 (1990). See generally Symposium, The Future of Personal Jurisdic-
tion: A Symposium on Burnham v. Superior Court, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 559 (1991).
137. The Burnham Court upheld a California court's exercise of transient jurisdiction
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"staying only a short time."1 38 A state court exercises transient juris-
diction when it claims the authority to issue a binding judgment
against a person simply because the person was served with a sum-
mons from the court while physically present, even briefly, within the
territorial confines of the state.1 39
No sensible architect of a regime for doing place-of-trial justice be-
tween the parties would include a provision allowing a plaintiff auto-
matically to sue a defendant in the courts of a particular state on any
matter whatever, so long as the plaintiff, with luck or permissible
guile, was able to serve the defendant with a summons within the bor-
ders of the state. There is a compelling case that transient jurisdiction
over Dennis Burnham, a New Jersey citizen, in a divorce action brought by his
spouse, Francie Burnham, after she and the Burnham children had moved to Cal-
ifornia from the couple's marital domicile in New Jersey. Under current jurisdic-
tional due process doctrine, the California court could decide Ms. Burnham's
marital status and the custody of the couple's children, because Ms. Burnham and
the children had become California domiciliaries. Linda Silberman, Reflections
on Burnham v. Superior Court: Toward Presumptive Rules of Jurisdiction and
Implications for Choice of Law, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 569, 590-91 (1991). On the other
hand, the California court needed in personam jurisdiction over Mr. Burnham to
litigate the economic details of the divorce. Id.
It is not clear whether Ms. Burnham should have been permitted to impose a
California forum on Mr. Burnham under the significant relationship test. The
forward-looking aspects of the family's relationship-the post-marital aspects-
no doubt are centered in California, primarily because the children now live
there. On the other hand, the move to California occurred only after the couple's
ten years of married life in New Jersey, during which time the children were
born. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 2, Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 U.S. 604
(1990) (No. 89-44); Brief on the Merits for Real Party in Interest at 2, Burnham v.
Superior Ct., 495 U.S. 604 (1990)(No. 89-44). Moreover, before Ms. Burnham and
the children left for the West Coast, she executed in New Jersey a marital settle-
ment agreement that purported to settle all of the issues that ordinarily arise at
the end of a marriage: division of the marital property, child custody, child sup-
port, and alimony. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 2-3, Burnham v. Superior
Ct., 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (No. 89-44); Brief on the Merits for Real Party in Interest
at 3 Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 U.S. 604 (1990). It is at least problematic
whether Ms. Burnham should have been permitted to impose a California forum
on her husband to resolve the validity of a separation agreement signed by the
two of them in New Jersey as New Jersey citizens to wind up a decade-long mar-
riage centered in New Jersey. The Burnhams shared a strong historical connec-
tion with New Jersey that they do not share with California. New Jersey was the
center of gravity of their marital relationship. Arguably, therefore, Mr. Burnham
should have been entitled under the second stage of the significant relationship
test to veto Ms. Burnham's choice of a California forum in favor of a New Jersey
forum. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
138. RANDOM HOUSE DIcrIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1505 (unabridged ed.
1971).
139. Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 629 n.1 (1990), 110 S. Ct. at 2120 n.1 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring). See also Ehrenzweig, supra note 125 at 289 (transient rule of
personal jurisdiction has it that in personam jurisdiction of individual defendant
can be acquired by mere physical service of process, even in forum where neither
plaintiff nor defendant resides and which has no connection with cause of action).
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violates the principles of political legitimacy underlying the mnimum
contacts doctrine.140
At least some of the members of the Burnham Court, mindful of
the counter-majoritarian character of their due process interventions,
were unwilling to condemn transient jurisdiction, given its long his-
tory and broad continuing acceptance among the states, whether or
not the practice, strictly speaking, violated the principles underlying
the Court's jurisdictional due process jurisprudence. 41 Only Justice
140. Visitors to states, of course, presumptively must respect the laws and legal sys-
tems of the polities they visit. Brilmayer et al., supra note 10, at 739 (stating that
surely may condition entry into state upon willingness to comply with state's
laws). A visitor who injures a resident in an automobile accident has a theoretical
obligation to answer for the injury in the host polity's courts. Id- (arguing that
when an individual enters state and engages in tortious activities there, state has
interest in adjudicating legality of conduct). But a visitor who changes planes
within a polity during a trip elsewhere has no moral obligation, based merely on
service of a summons in the airport lounge, to defend whatever lawsuit some
plaintiff happens to have brought against the visitor in the polity's courts--a law-
suit that by definition need not be related at all to the noncitizen's presence or to
the forum state. I&. at 754 (arguing that the state has clear governmental interest
in having visitors obey state law, but interest justifies only specific jurisdiction to
regulate local activities and not transient jurisdiction over unrelated claims).
Transient jurisdiction effectively equates visitors with de facto insiders, making
both subject to the general jurisdiction of the state's courts, and a visitor is hardly
the functional equivalent in political terms of a citizen. See id at 771 (arguing
that a state may not reasonably require individual, as condition for mere entry or
for occasional business, to consent to general jurisdiction over litigation arising
outside of state). Cf. Redish, supra note 8, at 1125 (stating the fact that the due
process analysis adopted by Pennoyer Court authorized state to assert jurisdiction
over individual merely passing through and with no previous contact with state
belies view that decision adopted theory of sovereignty premised on notions of
consent of governed).
141. Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court. Writing for himself, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia refused even to test tran-
sient jurisdiction against the minimum contacts standard. He read International
Shoe and the Court's minimum contacts precedents in general as limiting the ap-
plication of the standard to cases in which the defendant is not present, Burnham
v. Superior Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 621 (1990) and Justice Scalia added that "[w]e have
conducted no independent inquiry into the desirability or fairness of the prevail-
ing in-state service rule, leaving that judgment to the legislatures that are free to
amend it; for our purposes, its validation is its pedigree ... ." Id. His opinion
characterizes transient jurisdiction, or "tagging," as "one of the continuing tradi-
tions of our legal system," id. at 619, and concludes that the device's historical
acceptance and its continuing popularity conclusively establish its constitutional-
ity under the Due Process Clause: "The short of the matter is that jurisdiction
based on physical presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of the
continuing traditions of our legal system . I..." ld
Justice White, unwilling to concede that the Court necessarily is bound by
history in determining whether a jurisdictional practice of the state courts satis-
fies the Due Process Clause, wrote a short concurring opinion in Burnham indi-
cating that the wide acceptance and long roots of transient jurisdiction create a
curious sort of presumption in its favor: A court should not entertain an argu-
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Brennan explicitly denied any hesitation in applying the minimum
contacts doctrine to transient jurisdiction.142 Further, the opinion's
strikingly ineffectual defense of the practice 143 suggests strongly that
Burnham would have been an easy case the other way if the Court
had subjected transient jurisdiction to serious and honest scrutiny
under the reigning Burger King standard for jurisdictional due
process.
In his opinion announcing the judgment of the Burnham Court,
Justice Scalia seems to appreciate that transient jurisdiction would fail
the test of jurisdictional due process under the principles that animate
the minimum contacts doctrine,144 but he declines to measure tran-
sient jurisdiction against these principles.145 He pronounces the mini-
mum contacts doctrine irrelevant.146 The precedential fulcrum of his
argument is the sentence from International Shoe that launched the
minimum contacts era. Chief Justice Stone wrote in International
Shoe that "due process requires only that in order to subject a defend-
ant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the terri-
tory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that
ment that a particular exercise of transient jurisdiction violates the Due Process
Clause unless the defendant can demonstrate as a threshold matter that tagging
"is so arbitrary and lacking in common sense in so many instances that it should
be held violative of Due Process in every case," id. at 628 (White, J. concurring), a
showing that in Justice White's view the Burnham defendant had failed to make.
I& For a critique of Justice White's apparent willingness to tolerate individual
instances of jurisdictional unfairness so long as there is no showing of a pervasive
problem, see Mary Twitchell, Burnham and Constitutionally Permissible Levels
of Harm, 22 RuTGERs L.J. 659 (1991).
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor, pur-
ported to measure transient jurisdiction against modern jurisdictional due pro-
cess standards, Burnham v. Superior CL, 495 U.S. 604, 630-32 (1990). He
pronounced the practice constitutional, except perhaps in rare cases: "[A]s a rule
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on his voluntary pres-
ence in the forum will satisfy the requirements of due process," i& at 639 (foot-
note omitted), but "there may be cases in which a defendant's involuntary or
unknowing presence in a State does not support the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion over him." I&. at 637 n.11.
Finally, Justice Stevens, writing separately to disassociate himself from what
he considered the unnecessarily broad rhetoric in the other opinions, id at 640,
found it "sufficient to note that the historical evidence and consensus identified
by Justice Scalia, the considerations of fairness identified by Justice Brennan,
and the common sense displayed by Justice White, all combine to demonstrate
that this is, indeed, a very easy case." Id
142. See note 137 supra.
143. See Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 623-27 (1990). (Scalia, J.)(dismantling
Justice Brennan's case that transient jurisdiction passes muster under the mini-
mum contacts standard).
144. See Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 623-27 (1990)(arguing that transient
jurisdiction does not pass the minimum contacts test).
145. Id. at 621-23.
146. Id
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the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.' "147 This sentence undeniably implies the
constitutionality of transient jurisdiction and seems to treat jurisdic-
tion based on minimum contacts almost as a backstop approach for
those occasions when the defendant cannot be served with process
within the forum's borders. Moreover, the sentence suggests that
"traditional notions" should define jurisdictional due process, and Jus-
tice Scalia with some justification describes transient jurisdiction as
"one of the continuing traditions of our legal system .... 148
Justice Scalia's opinion quotes all or part of Chief Justice Stone's
sentence ten times1 49 and uses the term "traditional" or "tradition-
ally" thirty times,1 50 not only to show that Burnham flows from Inter-
national Shoe, but in service of a more general argument about how
the Due Process Clause should be read. As at least one journalist ob-
served when Burnham was handed down,151 this "obscure divorce
case"152 was a skirmish in the battle between the increasingly power-
ful conservative wing of the Court and the dwindling liberal contin-
gent about the extent to which history binds the Justices. It was a
skirmish fought on the one side by Justice Scalia, who is emerging as
the intellectual leader of the conservatives, and on the other side by
the now-retired leader of the liberal wing, Justice Brennan.153 Justice
147. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)(emphasis ad-
ded)(citations omitted).
148. Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990).
149. Id. at 609, 618, 619, 621, 621, 623 (twice).
150. Id. at 608, 609 (three times), 618, 619, 621 (twice), 622, 623 (three times), 626, 627
(twice).
151. Linda Greenhouse, High Court Still Groping to Define Due Process, N.Y. TIMES,
May 31, 1990, at A20.
152. Id.
153. The better known recent skirmish between the two Justices over the proper ap-
proach to interpretation of the Due Process Clause is Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110 (1989). Justice Scalia has emerged as the modern Court's most outspo-
ken proponent of the view that history dictates the content of substantive due
process. An interest can qualify as a protected liberty interest under Justice
Scalia's conception of substantive due process only if the interest is rooted in
American tradition. Id at 123 (Scalia, J., announcing the judgment of the Court).
Moreover, it is not enough that an interest can be said to be consistent with
American tradition at some high level of abstraction. In a recent footnote that
has received much attention, see Gregory C. Cook, Note, Footnote 6: Justice
Scalia's Attempt to Impose a Rule of Law on Substantive Due Process, 14 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 853 (1991), Justice Scalia takes the position that the Court
should focus on the most specific relevant American tradition. If this tradition
cuts against the argued-for liberty interest, then the interest should not receive
due process protection. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989).
Only Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Scalia's footnote 6 in Michael H.,
but Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined the rest of Justice Scalia's opinion,
apparently endorsing his more general point that history binds the Justices in
interpreting the Due Process Clause. Id at 132. The remaining five Justices re-
jected explicitly or implicitly the proposition that a value can qualify for due pro-
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Scalia prefers to treat as binding "a continuing American tradition
that a particular procedure is fair,"1 54 rather than to interpret the Due
Process Clause according to "each Justice's subjective assessment of
what is fair and just."'155 Justice Brennan, on the other hand, argues
in his Burnham concurrence that "all rules of jurisdiction, even an-
cient ones, must satisfy contemporary notions of due process." 5 6
Chief Justice Stone's language in International Shoe was dictum.
The International Shoe case did not involve transient jurisdiction.157
The Court, therefore, was not forced in International Shoe to confront
the implications of its new minimum contacts doctrine either for tran-
sient jurisdiction or for the other time-honored jurisdictional mecha-
nism approved in Pennoyer v. Neff-the attachment of a noncitizen's
in-state property at the outset of litigation.15s When the Court later
cess protection only if the value is rooted in American tradition. Id at 132
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment), 136 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by
Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.), 157 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.).
Justice Brennan strongly criticized Justice Scalia's approach:
The plurality's interpretive method is more than novel; it is mis-
guided. It ignores the good reasons for limiting the role of "tradition" in
interpreting the Constitution's deliberately capacious language....
In construing the Fourteenth Amendment to offer shelter only to
those interests specifically protected by historical practice, moreover, the
plurality ignores the kind of society in which our Constitution exists.
We are not an assimilative, homogeneous society, but a facilitative, plu-
ralistic one, in which we must be willing to abide someone else's unfamil-
iar or even repellent practice because the same tolerant impulse protects
our own idiosyncrasies.... In a community such as ours, "liberty" must
include the freedom not to conform. The plurality today squashes this
freedom by requiring specific approval from history before protecting
anything in the name of liberty.
Id at 140-41.
154. Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 625 (1990).
155. Id at 623.
156. Id. at 630.
157. In International Shoe, the Court held that the State of Washington could exercise
adjudicative jurisdiction over a noncitizen corporation to collect unpaid contribu-
tions to the state's unemployment compensation fund. The International Shoe
Court based its holding on the nature of the corporation's activities in the state
and not on the fact of in-state service of process on a corporate agent. Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945). It is far from clear that a
corporation even is susceptible to transient jurisdiction through in-state service of
process on corporate agents. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 10, at 748 and n.130
(noting judicial and academic skepticism about the applicability of transient juris-
diction to corporations). Professor Posnak has stated flatly that "[a] corporation is
not subject to jurisdiction simply because an agent was served while in the forum,
and this is true even though the agent was in the forum on corporate business."
Bruce Posnak, A Uniform Approach to Judicial Jurisdiction After World-Wide
and the Abolition of the "Gotcha" Theory, 30 EMORY L.J. 729, 731 n.9 (1981)(cita-
tion omitted).
158. In Pennoyer, Justice Field wrote that a state court may exercise authority over
property located within the borders of the state if the property is brought within
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considered, in Shaffer v. Heitner,159 whether attachment jurisdiction
violated jurisdictional due process, the Court declared the practice un-
constitutional. 60 Justice Marshall wrote for the Shaffer Court that
"all assertions of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according
to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny."16 '
Justice Marshall specifically rejected the notion that attachment juris-
diction's "long history" in American practice saves it: "The fiction that
an assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything but an assertion
of jurisdiction over the owner of the property supports an ancient
form without substantial modern justification. Its continued accept-
ance would serve only to allow state court jurisdiction that is funda-
mentally unfair to the defendant."162
Justice Scalia recognizes in his Burnham opinion that Shaffer
poses problems for him.163 He deals with the precedent in two ways.
First, he suggests that Justice Marshall's reasoning in Shaffer may not
have given enough credit to tradition. 64 Second, he distinguishes
Shaffer factually from Burnham, employing what Justice Brennan's
opinion aptly terms "nimble gymnastics."16 5 Justice Scalia reads all of
the Court's jurisdictional due process cases, from Pennoyer to Asahi,
as turning on the distinction between presence and absence.16 6 A
noncitizen's presence within a state is, and always has been, a suffi-
cient condition for the state's extension of judicial power against the
noncitizen.1 67 The minimum contacts doctrine developed only as a
means of determining when a state court may exercise authority over
a noncitizen despite the noncitizen's physical absence from the
state.168 Shaffer was an absence case and not a presence case, because
only the property of the noncitizen defendants was present within fo-
rum state, and, therefore, the Shaffer Court properly invoked the
minimum contacts doctrine.169
What Justice Scalia fails to explain is why the distinction between
presence and absence should be the axis on which all of the Courts
jurisdictional due process precedents turn. The distinction, after all, is
the control of the court through a device such as attachment at the outset of the
litigation. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
159. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
160. I& at 208-09.
161. Id- at 212 (footnote omitted).
162. Id,
163. "[The defendant's] strongest argument, though we ultimately reject it, relies
upon our decision in Shaffer...." Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619
(1990).
164. I& at 621-22.
165. Id at 632 (Brennan, J., concurring).
166. IM at 617-20.
167. Id at 618.
168. I&
169. I& at 621.
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not a principle, and Justice Scalia identifies no principle from which it
flows. The conclusion is virtually irresistible that Justice Scalia
merely found the distinction useful as a way of sidestepping, rather
than overruling Shaffer. Obeisance to precedent is not what animates
Justice Scalia's approach in Burnham. Instead, the approach grows
from Justice Scalia's conviction that history should bind the Justices
in fixing the dimensions of jurisdictional due process. History, then,
can get in the way of place-of-trial justice if we must rely on jurisdic-
tional due process to police the states' application of a private law
regime.
